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Abstract
This study presents a method to identify treatment effects without exclusion restrictions for
randomized experiments with non-compliance. It exploits a baseline survey that is commonly
available in randomized control trials. I show the identification of the average treatment effect
on the treated (ATT) and the local average treatment effect (LATE), assuming that a baseline
variable maintains similar rank orders to the control outcome.
I apply this strategy to a microcredit experiment with one-sided non-compliance to identify
the ATT. I find that the instrumental variable (IV) estimate of log revenue is 2.2 times larger
than my preferred estimate of log revenue.
Keywords: Exclusion restriction, Randomized experiment, Rank similarity.
JEL Classification: C31,C32,C33,D14,O16.
1 Introduction
Randomization of treatment assignment identifies the average treatment effect if everyone complies
with the assigned treatment. However, randomization becomes insufficient for identification when
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there is no perfect compliance. Under imperfect compliance, the average difference in outcomes
between the treatment and control groups becomes the intention-to-treat effect (ITT). The ITT is
usually not the primary parameter of interest. The ITT is not the effect of the treatment, as not
everyone takes the treatment. Instead, the ITT is the effect of the assignment. It is a weighted
mean of heterogeneous treatment effects by the treatment take-up behavior. The other parameter
of interest in which we are frequently interested is the treatment effect for those who take up the
treatment, called the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). The ITT identifies the effect of
treatment assignment whereas the ATT reveals the effect of taking the treatment for the subgroup of
the treated. However, the ATT is not identified simply by randomization of treatment assignment.
I propose a strategy to identify the treatment effect heterogeneity across endogenous post-
intervention decisions for randomized control trials (RCTs). I do not rely on valid instrumental
variables (IVs) or other specific designs that may not be available. Instead, I use an observation
from a baseline survey as a proxy for the control outcome on the endogenous subgroups. As a
particularly important case, I identify the ATTwhen the conventional assumption of no direct effect
of treatment assignment might not hold, and therefore, there is no valid instrument. I apply the
method to an experimental study of microcredit and demonstrate that the direct effect is not only
an attractive parameter in itself, but also crucial for the estimation of the magnitude of the ATT.
In this study, I provide non-parametric identification of treatment effects conditional on the
treatment take-up decision. The leading examples are randomized experiments with imperfect
compliance. In section 3, I show the identification of the subgroup effects conditional on treatment
take-up as the ATT and the direct effect for the case of one-sided non-compliance. In section 6,
this analysis is extended to the local average treatment effect (LATE) with additional assumptions.
Frangakis and Rubin (2002) formally define these subgroup effects as principal stratification. Most
studies rely on assumptions that might not be plausible for a given problem setup. For example, their
identification strategies rely on exclusion restrictions (Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Angrist, Imbens,
and Rubin, 1996) or a parametric model (Hirano, Imbens, Rubin, and Zhou, 2000).1 Zhang and
1Specifically, this study employs a Bayesian approach with a parametric assumption for the relationship between the
potential outcomes and the post-intervention variables conditional on model parameters. At least from the frequentist
2
Rubin (2003) and Rubin (2006) propose partial identification based on the monotone treatment
response type of assumptions, as in Manski (1997). One important exception is Deuchert, Huber,
and Schelker (2018), who extend the famous natural experimental study of the Vietnam Draft
Lottery, allowing the draft lottery to have a direct impact on political preferences. 2
The key idea of the identification is to exploit the typical feature of RCTs: a baseline survey.
Specifically, I exploit a proxy variable from a baseline survey for the control outcomes. I impose
restrictions on the latent rankings of the proxy variable and the control outcome. The latent ranking
of an outcome is a uniform random variable normalized to [0, 1] representing the underlying
percentile associated with the outcome measure. I assume that the distributions of latent rankings
for the proxy variable and the control outcome are the same conditional on the endogenous treatment
take-up. This fundamental assumption is called the rank similarity assumption (Chernozhukov
and Hansen, 2005; Athey and Imbens, 2006).3 Rank similarity, or its stronger version of rank
invariance, has appeared in rank imputation approaches, such as Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993),
Altonji and Blank (1999), Machado and Mata (2005), and Athey and Imbens (2006).4 Under
the rank similarity assumption, the treatment take-up may be endogenous. Therefore, the proxy
variable and the control outcome may be correlated with the treatment take-up even when the
treatment take-up has no causal effect on the proxy variable and the control outcome.5 6
viewpoint of the restriction, their parametric assumptions imply the conditional exogeneity of the post-intervention
variable to the potential outcomes.
2This issue of possible failure in exclusion restriction in the context of the draft lottery is challenged by Deuchert
and Huber (2017).
3My proposed assumption is slightly weaker than the original assumption of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005).
Nevertheless, similar lines of argument would apply to rationalize both assumptions.
4More recently, Han (2018) uses the rank similarity assumption to identify dynamic treatment effects with non-
separable models, and de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2017) study fuzzy design of change-in-changes models
assuming exclusion restriction of the treatment.
5The rank similarity assumption does not nest with conditional exogeneity assumption of the treatment. In fact,
if the treatment take-up is exogenous and has no causal effects on the proxy variable and the control outcome, then
the rank similarity assumption trivially holds as the (unconditional) distributions of the rankings are normalized to a
uniform distribution on the support of [0, 1].
6The rank similarity assumption is generally not testable. For the quantile treatment response model (Chernozhukov
and Hansen, 2005), Kim and Park (2017) propose a testing procedure for rank similarity in the presence of overidentifi-
cation. Unfortunately, their procedure does not apply to my model, as their overidentification restriction arises from the
exclusion restriction of multiple instruments. Dong and Shen (2018) and Frandsen and Lefgren (2018) propose other
testing procedures of the rank similarity assumption, but their restrictions are stronger than the original assumption of
(Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2005) and my proposed assumption.
3
The main contribution of this study is that it finds a natural experimental feature in typical
RCTs through the baseline survey. Exploiting this feature, I show the non-parametric point-
identification of the treatment effects without exclusion restrictions in experiments with non-
compliance. Recently and independently, Huber, Schelker, and Strittmatter (2019) propose a
change-in-changes (CiC) strategy in general principal stratification analysis for the Vietnam draft
lottery example. Nevertheless, my study complements recent natural experimental approaches
of Deuchert, Huber, and Schelker (2018) and Huber, Schelker, and Strittmatter (2019) in two
ways.7 First, I open up the usage of the change-in-changes strategies not just in the context of
natural experiments, but also in typical RCTs, which often collect baseline surveys. Second, I
show that the procedure does not necessarily require repeated outcome measures. This second
feature of the change-in-changes approach is essential in the context of RCTs, where the repeated
measures might not be available, but there might be some predictor in the baseline survey. For
example, graduation from high school on time would never be repeated. However, my proposed
procedure is feasible when there is some continuous proxy variable predicting graduation, such
as test scores. To my knowledge, this validity of the change-in-changes strategy without repeated
measure under randomization has not been emphasized in the literature.8 It is important to note that
this second feature is absent in the alternative difference-in-differences (DiD) approach because the
DiD explicitly requires that levels of outcomes in two periods are directly comparable.9
This study also provides an estimation and an inference strategy similar to the procedures for
change-in-change models (Athey and Imbens, 2006; Melly and Santangelo, 2015; Callaway, Li,
and Oka, 2018). My primary focus is on mean effects rather than quantile differences. Therefore, I
propose an estimator based on semi-parametric distribution regression (Chernozhukov, Fernández-
Val, and Melly, 2013) instead of quantile regressions, as in Melly and Santangelo (2015) and
7Unlike this study, Huber, Schelker, and Strittmatter (2019) consider more general variety principal stratification
analysis, including the case without randomization.
8For repeated but discrete outcomemeasures in two periods, Athey and Imbens (2006) employ a related but different
idea using conditional independence for CiC model to point-identify quantile treatment effects.
9Furthermore, I note that the support condition required in change-in-changes models as in Athey and Imbens
(2006) is not an additional assumption under randomization. Under randomization, we may start from the latent rank
variables normalized to uniform random variables U[0, 1] without having the support equivalence as an additional
assumption.
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Callaway, Li, and Oka (2018).10 In the appendix, I show weak convergence of the empirical
process for the proposed counterfactual estimator and the validity of bootstrap inference. I also
adopt the results of cluster robust weak convergence by Davezies, D’Haultfoeuille, and Guyonvarch
(2018) to accommodate many relevant experimental studies with cluster dependencies.
The proposed estimator is applied in the context of microcredit experiments in development
economics. Development economists are interested in the effect of expanding access to microcre-
dit opportunities in developing countries. Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman (2015) summarize six
recent experiments in different locations. For example, Angelucci, Karlan, and Zinman (2015) and
Crépon, Devoto, Duflo, and Parienté (2015) run large-scale microcredit experiments in Mexico and
Morocco. Microcredit companies visit treatment villages, and these companies provide microfi-
nance opportunities. Despite new credit being available, not all people in treated villages borrow
from the microcredit firms. This study aims to evaluate the effects of microcredit on those who
borrowed from the microcredit firms.
However, the conventional IV strategy is invalid if access to microcredit has a direct effect on
business outcomes of interest. For example, the availability of credit may change the behavior of
the subjects, including those whowould not ex-post use the credit. The experimental randomization
at the village level may generate a direct effect of access. For example, the local village economy
might be altered by the equilibrium effect through the interest rate of informal lending or local sales
price changes. Transfers among relatives or friends generate positive or negative spillover to those
who do not borrow credit. I point out that the IV estimate of the ATT, which is consistent under
the assumption of no direct effect, is subject to bias if the direct effect is non-zero. The bias can be
enormous even for a small direct effect when the take-up rate is relatively low.
Among many studies of microcredit experiments, Crépon, Devoto, Duflo, and Parienté (2015)
collect a detailed baseline survey. I use their data to estimate the ATT as the average effect of both
treatment access and microcredit take-up for those who take up credit. In addition, I separately
10There are advantages and disadvantages of quantile regression and distribution regression. While it is straightfor-
ward to estimate conditional quantile functions in quantile regression, a tail-trimming procedure is required to estimate
the conditional distribution functions. For the primary purpose of the mean effect unconditional of the covariates, it is
necessary to obtain the conditional distribution functions for the full support of the outcome of interest.
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estimate the average direct effect of microcredit access for those who do not take up credit. I find
that the IV point estimate of ATT is 2.2 times larger than my preferred estimate. The suggested
magnitude of the ATT estimate and the sign of the estimated direct effect implies the possibility
that there might be a small but positive direct effect. As a result, I demonstrate that the small direct
effect might lead to a possibly enormous bias in the IV point estimate of the ATT. 11
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section, I introduce notations and
parameters of interest as the subgroup effect. In section 3, I list formal identification assumptions
for the case of one-sided non-compliance. In section 4, I develop the estimation procedure with
bootstrap inference that is shown to be uniformly valid and cluster-robust in the appendix. In
section 5, I apply the one-sided non-compliance procedure to an experimental study of microcredit.
Finally, in section 6, I extend the framework to the case of two-sided non-compliance models along
with differential attrition problems. The final section concludes.
2 Parameter of Interest
2.1 Average Treatment Effect on Treated for One-Sided Non-Compliance
Consider a standard model of potential outcomes. Let T ∈ {0, 1} be treatment assignment, and let
Y be an observed outcome generated out of potential outcomes. The potential outcomes Y1 and Y0
are indexed by the assignment of intention to treatment T ∈ {0, 1} such that
Y = TY1 + (1 − T)Y0.
The average effect of the assignment T ,
E[Y1 − Y0] = E[Y1] − E[Y0]
11Crépon, Devoto, Duflo, and Parienté (2015) construct subgroups with predicted borrowing probabilities. People
with predicted probabilities of borrowing lower than 30% are considered non-borrowers. Knowing that there is no
effect on those non-borrowers, the authors conclude that there is no evidence of externality. For the discussion of their
approach, see the application of section 5.
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is called the intention to treatment effect (ITT). The ITT includes any direct effect of the treatment
assignment as well as any effect of treatment take-up enabled by the treatment assignment.
Although this ITT represents the average effect of the assignment T , usually the ITT is not the
ultimate goal of the study. Oftentimes, the parameter of interest is average effect of the treatment
take-up, not the average effect of the assignment to the treatment. Let D be a binary variable
representing the treatment take-up that the subjects choose endogenously after the assignment T .
Consider experimental assignment of T ∈ {0, 1} which introduces the treatment D ∈ {0, 1}. In
this case, the treatment take-up D = 1 is possible only if a unit, a subject of the experiment, is
assigned to the treatment group T = 1. On the other hand, the units with the treatment assignment
T = 1 may not comply with the assignment in take-up decision D. This is an example of one-sided
non-compliance experiments. The observed outcome is one of the three potential outcomesY11,Y10
or Y0 such that
Y = T(DY11 + (1 − D)Y10) + (1 − T)Y0
where Y11 is the outcome given the assignment T = 1 and taking the treatment D = 1, Y10 is the
outcome given the assignment T = 1 but not taking the treatment D = 0, and Y0 is the outcome
of the control group with T = 0 and D = 0.12 The leading parameter of interest is the following
average treatment effect on treated (ATT),
E[Y1 − Y0 |T = 1,D = 1] = E[Y11 − Y0 |T = 1,D = 1].
Example 2.1 (Example of Microcredit Introduction in Morocco). Crépon, Devoto, Duflo, and
Parienté (2015) study the effect of introducing microcredit in rural areas of Morocco. Authors
choose villages which have not experienced microcredit. Authors then randomly assign villages
into the treatment villages T = 1 and the control villages T = 0. Therefore, the take-up of the
12In this paper, one-index potential outcome Yt denotes the potential outcome if the unit was given the assignment
T = t, and two-index potential outcome Ytd denotes the potential outcome if the unit was given the assignment T = t
and the treatment D = d.
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microcredit offer D is restricted in the following manner:
D =

0 or 1 if, T = 1, a person is in the treatment village,
0 if, T = 0, a person is in the control village.
The ATT in this context is the effect of borrowing from microcredit, comparing the outcome of the
subgroup of borrowers D = 1 in the treatment village T = 1, against the same type of subgroup in
the control villages T = 0 who cannot borrow D = 0, but would have borrowed if they were in the
treatment villages.
2.2 Two Major Difficulty in Identification of the ATT
In randomized control trials,T is randomly assigned but the treatment take-upDmaybe endogenous.
Therefore, running a regression on the observed D may end up with biased estimates, known as the
bad control problem (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). For example,
E[Y |T = 1,D = 1] − E[Y |T = 1,D = 0]
=E[Y11 |T = 1,D = 1] − E[Y0 |T = 1,D = 0]
= E[Y11 − Y0 |T = 1,D = 1]︸                          ︷︷                          ︸
ATT
+ E[Y0 |T = 1,D = 1] − E[Y0 |T = 1,D = 0]︸                                                ︷︷                                                ︸
selection bias
.
Therefore, researchers often employ the random assignment T as the instrumental variable
for the treatment take-up D. Under three conditions, (i) random assignment T |=Yt , (ii) relevancy
Cov(T,D) , 0, and (iii) exclusion restriction E[Y10 − Y0 |T = 1,D = 0] = 0, the IV estimator
8
identifies the ATT
Cov(Y,D)
Cov(T,D) =
E[Y1 − Y0]
P(D = 1|T = 1)
=E[Y1 − Y0 |T = 1,D = 1]P(D = 1|T = 1)P(D = 1|T = 1)
+ E[Y1 − Y0 |T = 1,D = 0]P(D = 0|T = 1)P(D = 1|T = 1)
=E[Y11 − Y0 |T = 1,D = 1]
+ E[Y10 − Y0 |T = 1,D = 0]P(D = 0|T = 1)P(D = 1|T = 1)
=E[Y11 − Y0 |T = 1,D = 1].
However, the exclusion restriction may not be satisfied. In particular, assignment T itself may
have an impact on the outcome even for those who do not take the treatment D. This fact has two
consequences. First, the IV estimator is biased if the exclusion restriction is violated. 13 Second,
the direct impact on the outcome for those who do not take up the treatment D itself may have an
important policy implication. In particular, this parameter
Y10 − Y0
has been considered in the mediation analysis literature (e.g., Pearl, 2014) as the direct effect.
Oftentimes researchers avoid using IV estimator and report the ITT estimate concerning the
former issue of the bias in the IV estimator. However, the ITT does not reveal neither of the impact
of treatment take-up D, the ATT,
E[Y11 − Y0 |T = 1,D = 1] (1)
13The degree of bias depends on the take-up rate P(D = 1|T = 1). If P(D = 1|T = 1) > 0.5, then the magnitude of
the bias is less than E[Y10 − Y0 |T = 1,D = 0], but the bias will be inflated more than E[Y10 − Y0 |T = 1,D = 0] if the
take-up rate is low.
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nor the impact of treatment assignment T on non-takers, the direct effect on non-takers,
E[Y10 − Y0 |T = 1,D = 0]. (2)
Example 2.2 (Example 2.1 cont’d). There are experiments that researchers are aware of and inter-
ested in the direct impact of an assignment. Microcredit is an example of many such experiments.
Crépon, Devoto, Duflo, and Parienté (2015) list several reasons why the access T may have impact
even for those who do not borrow D from the microcredit institution:
There are good reasons to believe that microcredit availability impacts not only on
clients, but also on non-clients through a variety of channels: equilibrium effects via
changes in wages or in competition, impacts on behavior of the mere possibility to
borrow in the future, etc.
This possibility of the direct impact of the availability is not just making the identification of the ATT
difficult, but also emphasize the importance of the direct impact to understand the consequence of
the microcredit intervention. 14
In the following section, we explore an alternative identification strategy for both the ATT and
the direct effect in the mean differences
E[Y1d − Y0 |T = 1,D = d], d ∈ {0, 1}
as well as their quantile differences
Q1dY |D,T (τ |d, 1) −Q0Y |D,T (τ |d, 1), τ ∈ [0, 1], d ∈ {0, 1}
exploiting the baseline survey, which is the typical feature of the randomized control trials. 15
14Readersmaywonder if the possible violation of SUTVA assumptionmay appear with the spill-over and equilibrium
realization of the treatment take-up D. In the next section, I demonstrate that the typical modification of considering a
village cluster as a unit would work to justify a modified SUTVA assumption.
15Abbring and Heckman (2007) mention that one might be interested in quantiles of Y1 − Y0 rather than the
10
Throughout the main text, F tdY |W (·|w) represents conditional distribution function of the random
variable Ytd , and QtdY |W (·|w) represents conditional quantile function of the random variable Ytd .
3 Identification
3.1 Well-defined counterfactual
To begin with, we need to note that the ATT (1) and the direct effect (2) defined in the previous
section are well-defined.
If the direct effect arises because of the individualistic assignment directly altering behavior of
units, then the definitions are trivially well-defined as the SUTVA assumption (Rubin, 1980) can
be justified. When there is spill-over or equilibrium effects from community level interventions,
the typical approach is to assume SUTVA with community as the unit of the analysis.
In the case of the direct effect arises from strategic interactions leading to an equilibrium
behavior of take-up D within the community, I need to impose another assumption in addition to
usual SUTVA for communities being the units.
Assumption 3.1 (Modified SUTVA). For every unit c of assignment as a collection of observations
{1, . . . , nc} with the common assignment value T(c) ∈ {0, 1}, consider every observation i in each
unit c. Assume that there is a unique map of treatment take-up Dt(i; c) for each assignment
t ∈ {0, 1}. Assume also that there is a unique map of potential outcomes Yt,d(i; c) for every
t ∈ {0, 1} with the corresponding values of d such that Dt(i; c) = d.
Remark. The modified SUTVA additionally assumes that the equilibrium exists and unique for
each draw of a community. The modified SUTVA further assumes that the equilibrium outcomes
are also unique. In the case of individualistic assignment, the above modification reduces to the
conventional SUTVA with the unit c contains only a single observation.
quantile difference in the main text. However, the identification of this alternative parameter requires generally harder
assumptions than the assumptions studied in this paper. Therefore, this paper does not study this alternative parameter.
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Throughout this paper, I assume a random sample of units from the population consists of
identical units, either individuals or communities. For example, the ATT
E[Y11(i; c) − Y0(i; c)|T(c) = 1,D(i; c) = 1]
is the comparison of population means of potential outcomes Y11(i; c) against Y0(i; c) for the same
type of members i from identical communities c who would take up the treatment D(i; c) = 1 when
their community belongs to the treatment group T(c) = 1. Under the modified SUTVA assumption
3.1, the (no) take-up subgroup is stable and unique for a given draw of a community. Therefore,
the above comparison is feasible by comparing subgroup members of identical communities with
or without assignment T(c). However, the primary identification problem arises because we do not
observe these subgroups in a community without assignment T(c) = 0.
Below, I omit the index (i; c) for the potential outcomes for the ease of notations.
3.2 Identification assumption
The primary goal of this paper is to provide an identification strategy with endogenous post-
treatment covariates D without relying on instruments or specific experimental designs. The key
idea is the use of an additional variableYb from a baseline survey as a proxy for the control outcome
Y0. The baseline survey is data collected before the intervention starts. Collecting a baseline survey
is a common practice primarily for attaining more precise estimates or studying the subgroup effects
with the baseline covariatesW .
I assume the randomization of the assignment T is successful for the potential outcomes Y0 and
Y1, and baseline outcome Yb. Let W denote other pre-treatment covariates observed in a baseline
survey. Assume following conditional ignorability (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) holds because
explicit randomization rationalizes the assumption.
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Assumption 3.2 (Conditional Ignorability).
(Yt,Dt) |=T |W, ∀t ∈ {0, 1},
and
(Yb,Dt) |=T |W .
Under this assumption, we identify the following conditional ITTs
Lemma 3.1. If assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold, then
E[Y1 − Y0 |W = w] = E[Y |T = 1,W = w] − E[Y |T = 0,W = w]
for every w ∈ W.
Although I require certain similarity in the proxy variable Yb and the control outcome Y0, these
two random variablesYb andY0 may have entirely different distribution functions. Instead, I restrict
that the rankings of the two random variables Yb and Y0 to be similar. First, let me introduce the
concept of the rankings.
Definition 3.1 (Latent Rank Variables). Let W be a vector of baseline covariates. A random
variable Uw ∼ U[0, 1] indexed by each W = w is called (conditional) latent rank variable for a
random variable Y if
Y = QY |W (UW |W)
where QY |W (u|w) = inf{y : FY |W (y |w) ≤ u}.
Remark. Note that the existence of the latent ranking variable Uw is not an assumption. Such a
variable exists whether Y is finitely supported or continuous.
We can always construct such a conditional latent variable Uw as
Uw = FY |W=w(Y−) + V · (FY |W=w(Y ) − FY |W=w(Y−))
13
where V ∼ U[0, 1] and V |=W . The existence of such a conditional latent variable can be shown
as an extension to the unconditional latent variable existence of Proposition 2.1 in Rüschendorf
(2009).
For the identification, I need two requirements on the relation between the proxy variable Yb
and the control outcome Y0. First, I need to learn the complete latent ranking of Yb, Ub,w, over the
whole support of [0, 1]. In order to achieve the requirement, I assume Yb has a strictly increasing
distribution function over its support.
Assumption 3.3 (Unique quantile of the proxy). LetW be the support of W . Assume for every
w ∈ W, FbY |W (·|w) is strictly increasing over its support of Yb conditional onW = w.16
As mentioned earlier, F tdY |W (·|w) represents conditional distribution function of the random
variable Ytd , and QtdY |W (·|w) represents conditional quantile function of the random variable Ytd
throughout the main text.
This assumption is required for the point identification of the parameter of interest.17 For
the point identification, I rely on a continuous proxy variable Yb. However, I do not restrict the
nature of potential outcomes Y1 and Y0 unlike other CiC strategies which starts from repeated
outcome measures of the same kinds. These outcomes of interest may be finitely supported for the
point-identification.
Second, I assume the latent ranking of Yb has the same distribution as the latent ranking of Y0
conditional onW = w,T = 1,D = d. This restriction is called the rank similarity assumption.
Assumption 3.4 (Conditional Rank Similarity). Let Ub,w be the latent ranking of Yb, and U0,w be
the latent ranking of Y0 as defined in Definition 3.1. Suppose
Ub,w ∼ U0,w |W = w,T = 1,D = d
16This condition is equivalent to the conditional quantile function satisfies Qb
Y |W (FbY |W (y |w)|w) = y for every value
of y on the support of Yb conditional onW = w.
17The partial identification can be possible with a finitely supported proxy variable Yb , but I do not discuss in this
paper as the primary contribution of this paper is to propose the point-identification results.
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for each d ∈ {0, 1},w ∈ W1, whereW1 is the support ofW conditional on T .
This assumption says that the conditional latent rankings ofYb andY0 have the same distribution
for the subgroup, which is assigned to treatment T = 1 and choose D = d. It is important to note
that the distribution of the proxy Yb and the control outcome Y0 themselves may differ arbitrarily.
After discussing the identification formula, I will revisit this assumption in the case of one-sided
non-compliance for its straightforward interpretation.
In addition to these requirements, I assume following assumption on the support of the covariates
W ,18
Assumption 3.5. LetW1 be the support ofW conditional on T = 1, andW0 be the support ofW
conditional on T = 0. SupposeW1 =W0 ≡ W.
3.3 Identification Result
The parameter of interest is the counterfactual distribution F0Y |T,D(y |1, d) and the counterfactual
mean computed from the distribution.
Theorem 3.2. If the assumptions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 hold 19, then
F0Y |W,T,D(y |w, 1, d) = FbY |W,T,D(QbY |W,T (τy,w |w, 1)|w, 1, d)
for every d ∈ {0, 1},w ∈ W and y ∈ Y0 where
τy,w ≡ F0Y |W,T (y |w, 0).
18This assumption is stronger than necessary as I only require that the supportW1 is a subset of the supportW0.
19Note that I do not require the support condition of the ranking variables across assignment groups T = 1 against
T = 0, unlike Changes-in-Changes models starting from Athey and Imbens (2006). This difference comes from the
fact that Athey and Imbens (2006) study observational data with the treatment group population being different from
the control group. Such a restriction is not needed as the current problem is under the randomization assumption 3.2.
15
The mean of the post-treatment subgroup effect is identified as
E[Y1 |T = 1,D = d] − E[Y0 |T = 1,D = d]
as well as the subgroup quantile difference is identified as
Q1Y |T,D(τ |1, d) −Q0Y |T,D(τ |1, d)
for each d ∈ {0, 1} where
E[Y0 |T = 1,D = d] =
∫
ydF0Y |T,D(y |1, d),
F0Y |T,D(y |1, d) =
∫
F0Y |W,T,D(y |w, 1, d)dFW |T,D(w |1, d),
and
QtY |T,D(τ |1, d) = inf{y ∈ Yt : F tY |T,D(y |1, d) ≥ τ}
for every τ ∈ [0, 1] and each t ∈ {0, 1}.
The idea of the formula is summarized in Figure 1. For the simplicity, consider the case without
covariatesW . As Figure 1 panel A describes, first note that the events {Y0 ≤ y} and {U0 ≤ F0Y (y0)}
are equivalent almost surely for every y0 on the support of Y0. It is important to note here that Y0
may have a positive mass on the support of Y0, and the mass does not ruin this step because we only
need to evaluate F0Y (y0) on the support of Y0. Rank similarity equates the events {U0 ≤ F0Y (y0)}
and {Ub ≤ F0Y (y0)} in expectation conditional on {T = 1,D = d}. As Figure 1 panel B shows, we
may find the quantile of Yb in the support of the random variable Ub. Such a quantile QbY (u) can be
found for every u ∈ [0, 1] from the continuity of Yb. Therefore, for every value of the latent rank
F0Y (y0), we can point at its quantile QbY (F0Y (y0)) in terms of Yb. Then the events {Ub ≤ F0Y (y0)} and
{Yb ≤ QbY (F0Y (y0))} have the same probability conditional on {T = 1,D = d}. Thus, we equate the
conditional expectation of {Y0 ≤ y} with that of {Yb ≤ QbY (F0Y (y0))}.
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Proof. The counterfactual cdf F0Y |W,T,D(y |w, 1, d) is expressed as
F0Y |W,T,D(y |w, 1, d) =E[1{Y0 ≤ y}|W = w,T = 1,D = d]
=E[1{F0Y |W,T (Y0 |w, 1) ≤ F0Y |W,T (y |w, 1)}|W = w,T = 1,D = d]
=E[1{F0Y |W (Y0 |w) ≤ F0Y |W (y |w)}|W = w,T = 1,D = d]
=E[1{U0,w ≤ F0Y |W (y |w)}|W = w,T = 1,D = d]
in terms of the conditional latent rank U0,w. In the second and third equality, I use the assumption
that Y0 |=T |W and therefore, the support of Y0 |W = w,T = 1,D = d is the subset of the support
of Y0 |W = w,T = 1 that equals to the support of Y0 |W = w. The conditional rank similarity
assumption implies
E[1{U0,w ≤ F0Y |W (y |w)}|W = w,T = 1,D = d]
=E[1{Ub,w ≤ F0Y |W (y |w)}|W = w,T = 1,D = d]
=E[1{FbY |W (Yb |w) ≤ F0Y |W (y |w)}|W = w,T = 1,D = d].
From the unique quantile transformation with Yb and Yb |=T |W , we have
E[1{FbY |W (Yb |w) ≤ F0Y |W (y |w)}|W = w,T = 1,D = d]
=E[1{Yb ≤ QbY |T,W (F0Y |W (y |w)|1,w)}|W = w,T = 1,D = d]
=FbY |W,T,D(QbY |T,W (F0Y |T,W (y |0,w)|1,w)|w, 1, d)

Onemay think of this use of the proxy variableYb in an analogy to the control function approach.
(For example, Imbens and Newey, 2009, D’Haultfoeuille and Février, 2015, Torgovitsky, 2015,
and Ishihara, 2017). I use the reduced form variation in Yb conditional on W to back out the
unobservable scalar Ub,w in the reduced form equation. By the assumption of the rank similarity,
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the unobserved ranking variable U0,w has a direct relation to the other ranking Ub,w. Whereas the
triangular equation structure do not have the direct relations in the structural error U0,w and the
reduced form error Ub,w, therefore the control function approach requires an excluded instrument
to recover the relation in the two unobservables.
3.4 The Case of One-Sided Non-Compliance
The one-sided non-compliance structure reduces the rank similarity to a reasonably straightforward
restriction. To fix ideas, consider the case of the microcredit experiment. Let Y be the sales value
of the production output two years after the experiment. Yb is the same sales value of the production
output but measured before the experiment. While I demonstrate in the simplest case of the repeated
outcome measures in this example and the application, the same argument follows for the binary
indicator of business performance as the outcome of interest, for example.
To rationalize the rank similarity betweenYb andY0, consider there are scalar latent productivity
Ub,w andU0,w, which determine the rankings of the variablesYb andY0 conditional on other baseline
pre-determined variablesW . Such scalar rankings exist from Definition 3.1. I need to assume that
the rankings Ub,w and U0,w have the same meaning as productivity. In other words, people with
higherUb,w andU0,w should represent peoplewith higher latent productivity. Conditioning variables
W would help rationalize such a monotone relationship asW may include current borrowing status
or household characteristics.
This increasing property helps justification of the rank similarity assumption. The rank simi-
larity assumption holds if the sorting of the two latent productivity Ub,w and U0,w conditional on
the take-up decision D are the same. To further understand the restriction, consider that there
is common latent productivity U such that Ub,w = U and U0,w = U almost surely, then the rank
similarity trivially holds. This extreme example is called the rank invariance restriction.20 While
this specification is an extreme example, this is a fair starting point to relax. In particular, the
20While the rank invariance assumption restricts the joint copula of two random variables, the rank similarity imposes
assumptions on the marginal distributions of two random variables. In particular, Ub,w and U0,w may have arbitrary
positive correlation under the rank similarity, while Ub,w and U0,w must correlate perfectly under the rank invariance.
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rankings Ub,w and U0,w may accept random permutations from the common level U. Such random
permutations are called “slippages” (Heckman, Smith, and Clements, 1997). For example, let U˜b,w
and U˜0,w be a pair of identically distributed random variables. With a normalization by the common
distribution function F, the rank similarity may be maintained for the latent productivity of the
forms
Ub,w ≡ F(U + U˜b,w), U0,w ≡ F(U + U˜0,w) (3)
when the slippages are independent of unobserved determinants V of the treatment take-up D
conditional on their potential productivityU. This form shares similarity to factor models where a
single factor of productivity and independent shocks determine the two latent productivity.
Let me formalize the above statement. Following proposition reveals that the rank similarity
assumption is suitable when the self-selection occurs based on the potential “productivity”U rather
than the realization of the past productivity U +Ub,w.
Proposition 3.3. Let F(Ub,w) and F(U0,w) be the latent rank variables forYb andY0 conditional onW
constructed as in (3). Assume that there is a vector of unobservables V such that D = δ(U,V,T,W)
for some measurable map δ. If (U˜b,w, U˜0,w) |=V |U,T = 1,W and U˜b,w ∼ U˜0 |U,T = 1,W then
Assumption 3.4 holds.
The first assumption says that the slippages are independent of the shocks V to the treatment
take-up D conditional on the same potential productivityU, and the second assumption says that the
marginal distributions of the slippages are the same conditional on the same potential productivity
U. Note that the joint distribution of the slippages are not restricted so that the slippages may be
correlated each other.
Proof. See the online appendix. 
3.5 Flexibility of the Rank Similarity Assumption on D,Y1
The rank similarity assumption imposes restrictions on the marginal distributions of Y0 and Yb. On
the other hand, the remaining variables (D,Y1) are left flexible. For example, the common latent
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rankingU may arbitrarily correlate with (D,Y1) as long as the slippages (U˜b,w, U˜0,w) are independent
of (D,Y1) conditional on U. This flexibility implies that D may be endogenous to the potential
outcomes Y1 and Y0. The conditional exogeneity may still be possible under the rank similarity
assumption, although they are not nested.
Furthermore, Y1 may be left unrestricted as long as the slippages of Y0 and Yb are independent
of Y1. It is worth noting two facts. First, this rank similarity does not necessarily restrict the form
of the gains from T , Y1 − Y0. This absence of the restriction on the gain is a sharp distinction from
other bounding approaches based on restrictions such as monotone treatment response assumptions
Y1 ≥ Y0 such as Manski (1997).
Second, this model flexibly accepts peer effects or equilibrium effects due to the treatment
exposure T = 1 as in the following example.
Example 3.1. Consider every person i faces his/her community c which would affect his/her
outcome as an equilibrium response to the common treatment assignment T(c) = 1 within c.
For every person i in each community c, suppose that there are underlying potential outcomes
Y11(i; c),Y10(i; c) such that
Y1(i; c) = D(i; c)Y11(i; c) + (1 − D(i; c))Y10(i; c)
keeping Assumption 3.1 remains valid. For example, D(i; c) may take a generalized Roy structure
such that there isY1,1−D(i;c)(i; c) defined with D(i; c) = 1{Y11(i; c) ≥ Y10(i; c)+ (i)} for every i in the
community c so that the equilibrium exists and unique. Because of the strategic interactions, the
treatment take-up D may not be determined solely by the individual threshold crossing, but these
potential outcomes depend on treatment take-up of neighbours, D−i1,D(i;c)(c), where neighbours’
decision may depend on i’s behavior D(i; c). Suppose also that the potential outcomes with
treatment assignment T(c) = 1 is determined by the same potential productivity U(i) as for
the control and the slippages U˜11(i), U˜10(i) such that Y11(i; c) = Y11(U(i) + U˜11(i); D−i1,1(c)) and
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Y10(i; c) = Y10(U(i) + U˜10(i); D−i1,0(c)). In other words, the Roy model becomes
D(i; c) = 1{Y11(U(i) + U˜11(i); D−i1,1(c)) ≥ Y10(U(i) + U˜10(i); D−i1,0(c)) + (i)}
Here I assume Assumption 3.1, which guarantees the existence of unique equilibrium vector of
treatment take-up D(i; c) as the solution to the above interaction model.
In this case, the proposition justifies the rank similarity for Ub,U0 if
({U( j), U˜11( j), U˜10( j),D( j; c)} j∈c\i, (i)) |= (U˜0(i), U˜b(i))|U(i)
in addition to U˜b,w ∼ U˜0 |U,T = 1 which is the assumption solely on the control outcomes. Note
that the above condition does not impose independence of U(i) and U( j) within the community,
therefore, the outcomes within community may be correlated each other.
4 Estimation
For justifying the conditional rank similarity, it is desirable to condition on pre-treatment covariates
W . The curse of dimensionality becomes a serious issue when we estimate conditional distribution
functions for each subsample {T = 1,D = d,W = w} nonparametrically. Melly and Santangelo
(2015) and Callaway, Li, and Oka (2018) propose an extension to the Athey and Imbens (2006)
estimator allowing us to incorporate covariates as a semi-parametric model. As my major focus is
the mean effects rather than the quantile effects, I consider a distribution regression-based approach
rather than following a quantile regression approach of Melly and Santangelo (2015). Later, I
incorporate the recent development of cluster-robust inference for empirical process by Davezies,
D’Haultfoeuille, and Guyonvarch (2018) as cluster dependency must be inevitable in the leading
examples of my analysis. Nevertheless, my inference strategy closely follows the strategies inMelly
and Santangelo (2015) as well as Chernozhukov, Fernández-Val, and Melly (2013).
Now we start with the case of random sample for each observation. First consider an estimation
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of semi-parametric conditional distribution functions. For the estimation of the parameter of
interest, I need to estimate the following distribution functions
FbY |T=1,W, F
b
Y |T=0,W, {FbY |T=1,D=d,W }d∈{0,1} .
From now on, let W be a vector of transformation of the original pre-treatment covariates such
as polynomials or B-splines. Let K be the set of indexes for subgroups such as {T = 1,D = d}.
Following Foresi and Peracchi (1995) and Chernozhukov, Fernández-Val, and Melly (2013), I
estimate conditional distribution functions for Y conditional on a subgroup k out of K andW as
FˆY |W,K(y |w, k) = Λ(w′ βˆk(y))
for some known link function Λ(·)21 and
βˆk(y) = arg max
b∈RdW
n∑
i=1
{[I{Y (i) ≤ y} log[Λ(W(i)′b)]]
+ [I{Y (i) > y} log[1 − Λ(W(i)′b)]]} I{K(i) = k}
for each y ∈ Yk where Yk is the support of Y conditional on the subgroup k, and dW is the
dimension ofW .
Once these estimators are obtained, the conditional counterfactual distribution is obtained as
Fˆ0Y |W,T,D(y |w, 1, d) = FˆbY |W,T,D(QˆbY |W,T (Fˆ0Y |W,T (y |w, 0)|w, 1)|w, 1, d)
where
QˆbY |W,T (τ |w, 1) = inf
{
y ∈ Y1,wb : FˆbY |W,T (y |w, 1) ≥ τ
}
,
where Y1,wb is the support of Yb conditional on a T = 1,W = w, and therefore the unconditional
21Theoretically, the link functions can be different across subgroups k. I use logit link function throughout the
application but the robustness to other choice of link functions such as probit link or complementary log-log link are
shown in the appendix.
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distribution is obtained by
Fˆ0Y |T,D(y |1, d) = n−11,d
n∑
i=1
Fˆ0Y |W,T,D(y |W(i), 1, d)I{T(i) = 1,D(i) = d}
where n1,d ≡ ∑i I{Ti = 1,Di = d}. The mean effect of interest is obtained as follows
µˆd =
1
n1,d
∑
i:T(i)=1,D(i)=d
Yi −
∫
Y0
ydFˆ0Y |T,D(y |1, d)
and the quantile difference is obtained by inverting the distribution functions
Qˆ1Y |T,D(τ |1, d) − Qˆ0Y |T,D(τ |1, d).
For the case of random sample of clusters rather than the individual observations, the estimators
are essentially the same as
FˆCY |W,K(y |w, k) = Λ(w′ βˆC,k(y))
with
βˆC,k(y) = arg max
b∈RdW
C¯∑
c=1
N(c)∑
i=1
{ [I{Y (i; c) ≤ y} log[Λ(W(i; c)′b)]]
+ [I{Y (i; c) > y} log[1 − Λ(W(i; c)′b)]]} I{K(i; c) = k}
for each y ∈ Yk where C¯ is the number of the clusters, and N(c) represents the cluster size of
each cluster c. The difference appears in the bootstrap procedure and a few modifications in the
assumptions on the DGP.
In the online appendix, these estimators proposed above are shown to be uniformly asymptot-
ically normal and (clustered) exchangeable bootstrap inferences are valid for generating uniform
confidence intervals.
t
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5 Application
5.1 Background of the Microcredit Experiment in Morocco
In this section, I demonstrate the proposed method in the context of a microcredit experiment.
Crépon, Devoto, Duflo, and Parienté (2015) run an experiment in rural areas of Morocco. The
authors choose targeted areas so that villagers in the areas have not experienced the microcredit
services before this experiment. This location choice is an innovative feature of this microcredit
study. The authors estimate the effect of access against no access, rather than the effect of expanding
the microcredit. As is introduced in the identification section, let T denote the binary access to the
microcredit service, and let D be the binary take-up of microcredit. By construction, people in the
control villages T = 0 have D = 0 automatically. The administrative observation of the take-up
decision verifies the successful implementation of this procedure.
The most important feature of Crépon, Devoto, Duflo, and Parienté (2015) to the analysis of this
study is that they collect a detailed baseline survey before the experimental intervention. As a result,
the dataset contains the market values of the production output before and after the experiment. 22
More precisely, their study collects the output measure in the baseline survey before the experiment,
as well as in the follow-up survey two years after the experiment. Let Yb denote the baseline sales
value output and Y = TY1 + (1 − T)Y0 = T(DY11 + (1 − D)Y10) + (1 − T)Y0 denote the endline sales
value output.
In the experiment, a local microfinance institution called Al Amana enters villages which are
randomly selected treatment. The flow of the experiment is as follows. Initially, Al Amana opened
new branches at the beginning of the study. After the opening of the branches, the study collects a
baseline survey from villages. This baseline survey contains all the outcomemeasures that the study
is interested in as the terminal outcome measures. Once the study completes the baseline survey,
randomization separates 162 villages into 81 pairs of similar villages in observed characteristics,
and one of each pair is randomly assigned to be a treatment village and the other to be control
22This feature is very common in field experiments. However, not all studies allow me to apply my strategy as the
take-up behavior in the baseline sample is not reported.
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villages. For the treatment villages, Al Amana agents visits the villages and promotes microcredit
participation. At the time of the intervention, all the new branches are fully functional in their
services.
On the other hand, the control villages have no access to microcredit. We can verify this feature
of the one-sided non-compliance as the administrative report of the fraction of Al Amana clients is
zero for the control. The study collects baseline survey observations of 4465 households from 162
villages.
Table 1 below shows the ITT estimates using regression analysis to control for covariates. The
covariates include the number of household members, the number of adults, head age, and indicator
variables for animal husbandry, other non-agricultural activity, an outstanding loan over the past
12 months, household spouse being respondent to the survey, and other household member being
respond-ant to the survey.23
As the column (1) shows, there is a positive and significant effect of the access to microcredit on
the sales value of the production outputs. As my method requires a continuous Yb, I need to restrict
the study sample to the individuals who have positive sales values in the baseline survey.24 Such
sample selection would possibly change the interpretation of the effect, but it would not generate
any bias. The columns (2) and (3) show the same estimates but for the self-employed individuals
at the baseline. This procedure reduces the sample size to about half of the original sample. The
column (2) shows the effect on the level of output and the column (3) shows the effect on the log of
output.25 The rest of the arguments are all based on the log output as the distribution of the revenue
is heavily right-skewed with a few outliers. Both effects are positive and precisely measured.
23These linear regression analysis also condition on strata dummies (paired villages). For my procedures, these
paired village dummies are not included in order to prevent the incidental parameter problem for non-linear estimators.
24As emphasized earlier, Y0 and Y1 do not need to be continuous. Conditional on Yb > 0, there are observations with
Y = 0 which represents exit behaviors during the study period, and the mass at Y = 0 does not ruin the analysis.
25As the output values contain zero, the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, log(x +
√
x2 + 1), is applied instead
of the natural log. Therefore, the estimates have an interpretation of the approximated semi-elasticities for small effects.
Although we need to convert larger effects through hyperbolic sine formula, standard exponential approximation works
well for the evaluation at large mean, which is the case for this study. Bellemare and Wichman (2018) explore detailed
discussion.
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5.2 Original Use of the Baseline Survey
Crépon, Devoto, Duflo, and Parienté (2015) report the baseline survey for a similar purpose to mine.
The purpose is to assess the heterogeneity in the ITT of the access to microcredit by subgroups
with particular take-up decision. In particular, our shared concern is the possibility of the direct
effect of microcredit access for those who do not take up credit.
As I quoted earlier in example 2.2, there are many reasons why the access to microcredit might
have a direct effect even though people do not take up credit. For example, the promotion of the
credit company might encourage small business owners to continue their business. Because of the
new access, the owners expect to have additional credit available in the future even though they
are not borrowing right now. The nature of the village level assignment also generates equilibrium
effects and peer effects. The expanded credit use in the treatment villagewould alter the interest rates
of informal lending and product prices within the village as equilibrium realizations. Furthermore,
non-borrowing people might receive transfers from relatives and friends who succeed in their
business due to borrowing, while these people might also need to cover the payment for the debt of
failing relatives.
The idea of the original study is to estimate the propensity to borrow from microcredit using
covariates from a baseline survey. In other words, the parameter
E[Y1 − Y0 |P(D = 1|W = w) = p] = E[Y1 − Y0 |W ∈ Wp]
is identified, whereWp ≡ {w ∈ W : P(D = 1|W = w) = p}. With this parameter, one might test
the following hypotheses
HHigh0 : E[Y1 − Y0 |P(D = 1|W = w) ≥ pH] = 0,
HHigh1 : E[Y1 − Y0 |P(D = 1|W = w) ≥ pH] , 0,
26
and
HLow0 : E[Y1 − Y0 |P(D = 1|W = w) < pL] = 0,
HLow1 : E[Y1 − Y0 |P(D = 1|W = w) < pL] , 0.
Table 2 shows the results in the original article based on a regression analysis. The results suggest
that the units with top 30% of the propensity score have a more substantial and significant effect,
while the units with bottom 30% have a small and insignificant effect.
However, testing HHIGH0 or H
LOW
0 do not necessarily relate the primary interest of whether the
direct effect exists and invalidate the use of IV estimator. First, the event of the low propensity
score {P(D = 1|W = w) < pL} might be different from the event of no take-up under treatment
{D = 0,T = 1}. The subgroup of non-borrowers (D = 0,T = 1) might be sorted on unobservables
by D, but the propensity score based strategy allows sorting only on observablesW . Second, as we
see in the discussion of the identification section, a small violation to the exclusion restriction might
result in a large magnitude of the bias in the ATT when the take-up probability is low. Therefore,
a small violation to the null H0, which is not detectable, might generate a huge bias in the ATT.
Following Table 3 shows the original and additional IV estimates which are valid only if the
direct effect is zero. Under the conventional assumption, the estimated ATT might overestimate
the effect for those who take credit, and the policymakers might have been overly encouraged to
promote the entry of the microcredit services. I would like to compare my preferred estimate with
this ATT estimate by two stage least squares (2SLS).
5.3 Estimation of Direct and ATT of Microcredit
With the baseline outcomeYb being the proxy for the control outcomeY0, it is possible to identify the
counterfactual distribution of Y0 conditional on the endogenous subgroup {T = 1,D = d} directly
for each d ∈ {0, 1}. See the detail of this procedure for section 3.
Outcomes Yb and Y0 are sales values of production outputs from small business activities. By
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the random assignment of the credit access T and the fact that microcredit had not been available
for the baseline period and the control villages, these two outcomes Yb and Y0 should be similar but
the random shocks realized over two years of the study. If we assume that the changes over time,
the slippages U˜b,w and U˜0,w, in the rank orders from the potential productivity ranking U do not
depend on their counterfactual credit take-up decision D conditional onU, then the rank similarity
assumption might be justified.
Table 4 shows the estimates of the subgroup effects unconditional on W by integrating out.
Column (1) is for the direct effect of not taking the credit D = 0 in the treatment village T = 1.
Column (2) is for the ATT as the combined effect of the treatment take-up D = 1 and the access
T = 1 for the takers.
The ATT of the microcredit use and access for those who take up credit is shown in column (2).
The ATT is strongly positive and significant. However, the magnitude of the ATT is less than 45%
of the 2SLS estimate which should be comparable if the direct effect is zero.26 The direct effect
of microcredit for those who do not borrow credit is shown in column (1). Although the estimated
direct effect is not significant, the magnitude of the ATT (2) indicates that the direct effect might
be positive. In the online appendix, I display quantile differences of the direct effects (Figure 2, in
the Appendix) and that of the combined effects for take-ups (Figure 3, in the Appendix) along with
the uniform 95% confidence intervals. Results indicate that there are relatively monotonous effect
over the range of quantile values for the combined effect for the treated.
It is worth emphasizing that the findings in Table 4 might alter policy decision made by
policymakers. In order to better inform the policymakers, it is encouraged to use this approach
when the direct effect is of primary interest, and therefore, the collection of a detailed baseline
survey adds an option to evaluate the intervention of interest to further understand the nature of the
treatment effect.
26They are not precisely comparable to the estimate in (2) is the unconditional subgroup effect, while the estimate in
(3) is the conditional subgroup effect from the regression analysis. Nevertheless, the unconditional ATT by integrating
out the covariates produces higher magnitudes which instead reinforces the issue I raise here.
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6 Extensions
6.1 The Case of Two-Sided Non-Compliance
I have demonstrated the use of the proposed methodology for an experiment with one-sided non-
compliance. With an additional assumption, I show that this approach also applies to an experiment
with two-sided non-compliance.
Consider a two-sided incompliance experiment where the treatment D may be available before
the experimental assignment of the treatment T . Let D1 and D0 denote the potential choice under
the treatment assignment T so that D = TD1 + (1 − T)D0. As is usually assumed, suppose the
monotonicity holds. Suppose D1 ≥ D0 almost surely as the treatment assignment let more people
taking-up the treatment D.
In this case, the outcome of interest takes the form
Y = T(D1Y11 + (1 − D1)Y10) + (1 − T)(D0Y01 + (1 − D0)Y00) (4)
where Ytd represents the outcome if the treatment assignment is T = t and the treatment take-up is
D = d.
Consider a similar identification strategy using rank similarity assumption. For the two-sided
non-compliance, latent rankings of Y0 and Yb might not be similar. In two-sided non-compliance
experiments, treatment D = 1 may be available for the control group T = 0. There are two
possibilities for the treatment D being available for the control group T = 0.
One possibility is that the treatment has not been available prior to the assignment. (For
example, Deuchert, Huber, and Schelker, 2018, no anticipation assumption.) In this case, latent
rankings of the baseline outcome Yb when the treatment has not been available may be similar to
that of the outcome without treatment Y00 among those who would not take-up T = 0,D = 0.
The other possibility is that the treatment has been available throughout two periods but the
take-up behavior is “stable” over time. (For example, de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille, 2017,
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Assumption 2.) 27 In this latter case, latent rankings of the baseline outcome Yb and that of the
control outcome without treatment Y00 might represent the same outcome for the same subgroup of
non-takers T = 0,D = 0. In both cases, the same strategy of rank similarity with the latent rankings
of Yb and Y00 among the same non-takers T = 0,D = 0.
Formally speaking, I modify the rank similarity assumption to the following:
Assumption 6.1 (Rank Similarity for Two-Sided Non-Compliance). Suppose that assumptions 3.2
and 3.5 holds. Fix a value of d ∈ {0, 1}. For every w ∈ W, let Ubd,w be the latent ranking of
Yb conditional on T = 0,D = d,W = w and U0d,w be the latent ranking of Y0d conditional on
T = 0,D = d,W = w.
Assume that
Ubd,w |D1 = d,D0 = d,W = w ∼ U0d,w |D1 = d,D0 = d,W = w
for every w ∈ W.
For the case of D1 ≥ D0 almost surely, consider d = 0. The modified assumption states that
the latent rankings defined for the subgroup of {T = 0,D = 0} = {D0 = 0} under randomization
assumption 3.2 have the same distributions conditional on its further subgroup of {D0 = 0,D1 = 0}.
The formal statement of the above idea is summarized below: 28
Theorem 6.1. Consider two-sided non-compliance model
(Y11,Y10,Y01,Y00,D1,D0,W,Yb) such that the observed outcome is generated as (4). Suppose as-
sumptions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.5 hold and, assumption 3.3 holds for a baseline variable Yb conditional
onW,T = 0,D = 0. Let Ub0,w be the latent ranking of Yb conditional on T = 0,D = 0,W = w.
27Stability may rationalize the rank similarity even in the case of strategic interaction. For example, switching of
take-up status among compliers may sustain the behaviors and the outcomes of never-takers when the spill-over is
distributional, i.e., the identity of the treated neighbor do not matter.
28The stated formula in this case is numerically equivalent to the one stated in Huber, Schelker, and Strittmatter
(2019) when outcomes in two periods are both continuously distributed. On the one hand, Huber, Schelker, and
Strittmatter (2019) assume continuous outcomes in two periods and exploit the inverse of the distribution function of
the post-intervention outcomes to produce the counterfactual quantile directly. On the other hand, I do not assume the
continuity of the outcome by not inverting the distribution function of the post-intervention outcome to produce the
counterfactual distribution.
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Suppose further that assumption 6.1 holds with d = 0, and D1 ≥ D0 almost surely holds. Then
F0Y |D1=0(y) =
∫
FbY |D=0,T=1,W (QbY |D=0,T=0,W (F00Y |D=0,T=0,W (y |w)|w)|w)dFW |D=0,T=1(w)
Proof. See the appendix. 
The above theorem identifies the control outcome distribution for the never-takers. By the law
of total probability, the control outcome distribution for the mix of complier and always takers is
identified.
To identify the local average treatment effect (LATE), we need additional assumption. Here I
propose a weaker version of no direct effect assumption.
Assumption 6.2 (Homogeneous direct effect). Suppose
Y11 − Y01 = Y10 − Y00
almost surely, and
E[Y11 − Y01 |T = 1,D = 1] = E[Y11 − Y01 |T = 1,D = 0]
This restriction assumes the direct effect of having the treatment assignment is homogeneous
with or without the actual treatment take-up D = 1 or D = 0. This assumption is strong. However,
the homogeneity restriction is substantially weaker than the no direct effect assumption, which
assumes the direct effect is constant and the constant is zero.
Let
DE ≡ Y11 − Y01 = Y10 − Y00.
Let me also specify
Y˜1 ≡ Y01, Y˜0 ≡ Y00
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so that
Y11 = Y˜1 + DE,Y10 = Y˜0 + DE .
Here Y˜d represents the outcome of taking the treatment D or not.
Under this assumption, the subgroup effects take following forms
E[Y1 − Y0 |T = 1,D = 1] =E[(1 − D0)(Y˜1 − Y˜0) + DE |T = 1,D1 = 1]
=E[(1 − D0)(Y˜1 − Y˜0)|T = 1,D1 = 1] + E[DE |T = 1],
and
E[Y1 − Y0 |T = 1,D = 0] = E[DE |T = 1,D1 = 0] = E[DE |T = 1].
Note that
E[(1 − D0)(Y˜1 − Y˜0)|T = 1,D1 = 1]
=E[1 ∗ (Y˜1 − Y˜0)|T = 1,D1 = 1,D0 = 0]P(D0 = 0|D1 = 1)
+ E[0 ∗ (Y˜1 − Y˜0)|T = 1,D1 = 1,D0 = 1]P(D0 = 1|D1 = 1)
=E[Y˜1 − Y˜0 |T = 1,D1 > D0]P(D1 > D0)P(D1 = 1)
where P(D1 > D0) = 1 − P(D1 = 0) − P(D0 = 1), and
E[Y˜1 − Y˜0 |D1 > D0]
is the local average treatment effect (LATE).
6.2 Example: Differential Attrition Problem
While the rank similarity may be rationalized in both cases of (i) introducing treatment which has
not been available and (ii) stable control group, the former case might be difficulty to rationalize
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when there is some changes other than the intervention occurs in the control group. One exceptional
case is the attrition problem.
Attrition is a serious concern in experimental evaluation. The attrition as non-compliance to
the survey take-up D may occur only after the intervention T , and the fundamental issue of the
differential attrition is that the intervention may alter the take-up rate, i.e., D1 , D0.
Consider the case of potential outcomes Y1,Y0 are sample selected values of true potential
outcomes Y ∗1 ,Y
∗
0 so that
Y1 = D1Y ∗1 ,Y0 = D0Y
∗
0
Let Y ∗1 ,Y
∗
0 > 0 so that 0 is taken only by the missing values. This definition is a normalization
available for the bounded supported Y ∗t by adding the minimum of Y ∗t to make it positive.
Suppose the case where D1 ≤ D0 almost surely. In other words, the treatment T requires some
actions which would reduce the take-up rate of the survey in treatment D1 relative to the rate in the
control D0.
Contrary to the previous argument of general case of two-sided non-compliance, we are inter-
ested primary in
E[Y1 − Y0 |T = 1,D1 = 1] = E[Y1 − Y0 |T = 1,D1 = 1,D0 = 1] = E[Y ∗1 − Y ∗0 |D1 = 1,D0 = 1]
from the monotonicity, and there is no role of the homogeneous direct effect. Finally, assume we
have baseline observation Yb for the proxy of Y0. Let F0∗Y |W (·|w) denote the conditional distribution
function of Y ∗0 .
Corollary 6.2. Consider the differential attrition model (Y ∗1 ,Y ∗0 ,D1,D0,W,Yb) as specified above.
Suppose assumptions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.5 hold and, assumption 3.3 holds for a baseline variable Yb
conditional on W,T = 0,D = 1. Let Ub1 be the latent ranking of Yb conditional on T = 0,D =
1,W = w.
Suppose further that assumption 6.1 with d = 1, and the monotonicity in the form of D0 ≥ D1
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almost surely holds. Then
F0∗Y |D=1,T=1(y) =
∫
FbY |D=1,T=1,W (QbY |D=1,T=0,W (F0∗Y |D=1,T=0,W (y |w)|w)|w)dFW |D=1,T=1(w)
so that we have identification of
E[Y ∗1 − Y ∗0 |D1 = 1].
Proof. The proof immediately follows as a special case of theorem 6.1 by flipping the order of the
monotonicity from D1 ≥ D0 to D0 ≥ D1, and focused on the case of D1 = 1 which implies D0 = 1
almost surely. 
Remark. The same approach may not work if the differential attrition works in the other way,
namely D1 ≥ D0. Nevertheless, if we may assume the rank similarity in Ub and U∗1 conditional on
T = 1,D = 1,W = w, then the same argument works to identify
E[Y ∗1 − Y ∗0 |D0 = 1].
7 Conclusion
This study presents a method to identify the treatment effect heterogeneity across endogenous
decisions in randomized experiments that does not require any additional instruments or specific
experimental design. Instead, I use a variable from a baseline survey to proxy for control outcomes.
This method requires only that the continuous proxy variable and the possibly discrete control
outcome are similar in rank order.
For the one-sided non-compliance case, I identify the ATT while allowing access to microcredit
to have a direct effect. The identification of the ATT uses the proxy variable predicting the outcome
measure in the baseline survey. In the microcredit application, I find that the ATT estimate under
the conventional assumption of no direct effect produces estimates 2.2 times larger than that of my
preferred estimate.
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It is worth noting that the subgroup effects and the procedure for the identification of the
subgroup effects apply flexibly to a variety of randomized policy evaluation problems. The key
innovation of this study is that it allows for flexibility in the type of outcome measures. Although
the most natural proxy variable is the baseline survey version of the endline outcomes of interest,
the proxy variable of the exact repeated measure might not be available in the baseline survey. The
proposed strategy applies to the binary outcome measures (which are not repeatable), such as an
event of survival or attainment of degrees. As difference-in-differences strategy is not available
without exactly comparable repeated outcomes, this feature emphasized in this paper adds values
to the change-in-changes strategies under randomization.
Furthermore, this study demonstrates the use of the strategy for the two-sided non-compliance
problem. For the general case of the two-sided non-compliance, I show the identification of the
LATE and the direct effect under additional assumptions of monotonicity and homogeneous direct
effect. The differential attrition is an important special case in which I show the identification of
the attrition free average effect under the monotonicity assumption.
Although the proposed identification strategy is based on the innocuous rank similarity assump-
tion, this study enables a direct procedure to identify the ATT in addition to the ITT with the help
of proxy variables from the baseline survey. As the microcredit application suggests possible bias
in the ATT due to a failure of the no direct effect assumption, this study shows the importance of
identifying the treatment effect heterogeneity directly. The proposedmethod provides an alternative
method for the applied researchers to offer better policy guidance under a better understanding of
the treatment effects.
Allowing non-repeated measures for change-in-changes strategies open up further possibility
for the identification of treatment effects. For example, one may not have any continuous baseline
variables but has a vector of variables which would predict the outcome of interest. The estima-
tion procedure follows a specific semi-parametric distribution regression to tackle possible high
dimensionality. The parametric assumption imposed might not be an innocuous restriction and the
proposed procedure might have a small sample problem when there are many discrete covariates.
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Offering tests for rank similarity through covariates based on Dong and Shen (2018) or Frandsen
and Lefgren (2018) modified to this procedure may be important for the validity of the procedure.
Tackling these identification and estimation issues remain for future research.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Graphical representation of the identification formula
Table 1: Intention to treatment effects on business outcomes
Outcome: output output log output †
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 6061.3*** 5888.8* 0.3215***
(2166.8) (3038.7) (0.1167)
self-employed self-employed
at baseline at baseline
control mean 30,450 33,554 8.7079
Obs 4,934 2,453 2,453
Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis are clustered in village
levels. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance of 10%, 5%,
1% sizes respectively. Units in levels are Moroccan Dirham, 1MAD
≈ 0.106 USD. † : inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, log(x +√
x2 + 1), is applied instead of the log to prevent ill-defined value for
output value equals to zero.
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Table 2: Heterogeneity by high/low propensities
Outcome: output output log output
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 15773.7*** 13647.2** 0.4736**
High 30% (4153.6) (6095.3) (0.1985)
Treatment 646.6 1818.3 0.2739
Low 30% (2701.1) (4088.1) (0.1900)
self-employed self-employed
at baseline at baseline
control mean 30,450 33,554 8.7079
Obs 4,934 2,453 2,453
Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis are clustered in village
levels. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance of 10%, 5%,
1% sizes respecively.
Table 3: ATT under assumption of no direct effect
Outcome: output output log output
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 36252.6*** 42025.7* 2.2949***
(12494.2) (21525.0) (0.8494)
self-employed self-employed
at baseline at baseline
control mean 30,450 33,554 8.7079
Obs 4,934 2,453 2,453
Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis are clustered in village
levels. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance of 10%, 5%,
1% sizes respecively.
A Appendix: Not for publication
In this appendix, I denote FYtd the distribution function of random variableYtd instead of the notation
in the main text.
A.1 Asymptotic Normality and Bootstrap Validity for Random Samples
Assume following data generating process,
Assumption A.1 (DGP). The sample {Y (i),Yb(i),D(i),W(i),T(i)}ni=1 is an iid draw from the prob-
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Table 4: Estimates with baseline proxy Yb
Method: Rank Similar 2SLS
Label: Direct ATT ATT
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 0.2837 1.0252** 2.2949**
Effect (0.2628) (0.4180) (0.8494)
exp(TE) - 1 0.3280 1.788 8.9234
Obs 2453 2453 2453
p
Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis are generated from 300
bootstrap draws clustered in village levels for (1)-(3). *,**,*** in-
dicates statistical significance of 10%,5% and 1% sizes respectively.
Logit link is used for (1) and (2). 2SLS in (3) uses the same set of
covariates as in (1) and (2).
ability law P over the support {Y × Yb × {0, 1} ×W × {0, 1}}.
Let Y0 be a support of Y conditional on T = 0, and let Y1,db andWd be supports of Yb andW
conditional on T = 1 and D = d for each d ∈ {0, 1}. SupposeY0×W andY1,db ×Wd are compact
subsets of R1+dw for each d ∈ {0, 1}. If Y0 is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure, then suppose the conditional density fY |W,T (y0 |w, 0) is uniformly bounded and uniformly
continuous in (y0,w) ∈ Y0 ×W. Also suppose that fYb |W,T (yb |w, 1) and fYb |W,T,D(yb |w, 1, d) are
uniformly bounded, and uniformly continuous in and (yb,w) ∈ Yb × W for each d ∈ {0, 1}.
Furthermore, n1,dn ≡ 1n
∑
i I{Ti = 1,Di = d} →p α1,d ≡ Pr(Ti = 1,Di = d) > 0 for each d ∈ {0, 1},
and n0n =
1
n
∑
i I{Ti = 0} →p α0 ≡ Pr(Ti = 0) > 0.
Assume also that the conditional distribution functions have the following semiparametric forms
Assumption A.2 (Distribution Regression). Suppose we have
FY |W,T (y |w, 0) = Λ(w′β0(y)),
for some link function Λ(·) for all y,w. Assume also that the minimal eigenvalue of J0(y) ≡
E
[
λ(W ′β0(y))2
Λ(W ′β0(y))[1−Λ(W ′β0(y))]WW
′
]
is bounded away from zero uniformly over y. And the analogous
restriction holds for
FYb |W,T (y |w, 1) = Λ(w′β1(y))
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and
FYb |W,T,D(y |w, 1, d) = Λ(w′β1,d(y))
for each d ∈ {0, 1}.
Assume further that E ‖W ‖2 < ∞.
This is a standard regularity condition for distribution regression models (Chernozhukov,
Fernández-Val, andMelly, 2013). Under these assumptions, these conditional distribution functions
weakly converge jointly. Let
Gˆ1,d(y1,db ,w) =
√
n
(
FˆYb |W,T,D(y1,db |w, 1, d) − FYb |W,T,D(y1,db |w, 1, d)
)
, ∀y1,db ∈ Yw,{1,d}b
Gˆ1(y1b,w) =
√
n
(
FˆYb |W,T (y1b |w, 1) − FYb |W,T (y1b |w, 1)
)
, ∀y1b ∈ Yw,1b
Gˆ0(y0,w) =
√
n
(
FˆY0 |W,T (y0 |w, 0) − FY0 |W,T (y0 |w, 0)
)
, ∀y0 ∈ Yw,0,
for every w, d ∈ W × {0, 1}.
Lemma A.1. Under assumptions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, A.1 and A.2,
(
Gˆ1(y1b,w), Gˆ1,d(y1,db ,w), Gˆ0(y0,w)
)
 
(
G1(y1b,w),G1,d(y1,db ,w),G0(y0,w)
)
in l∞(Yb ×W×Y1,db ×Wd ×Y0 ×W), where Gk(y,w) for every k ∈ {1, {1, d}d∈{0,1}, 0} are tight
zero-mean Gaussian processes with each covariance function of the form
Vk,k(y,w, y˜, w˜) = α−1k w′J−1k (y)λk(w′βk(y))Σk(y, y˜)λk(w˜′βk(y˜))J−1k (y˜)w˜
V1,{1,d}(y,w, y˜, w˜) = α−11,dw′J−11 (y)λ1(w′β1(y))Σ1,{1,d}(y, y˜)λ1,d(w˜′β1,d(y˜))J−11,d(y˜)w˜
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where
Σk(y, y˜) =E[I{K = k}WH(W′βk(y))
×{min{Λ(W′βk(y)),Λ(W′βk(y˜))} − Λ(W′βk(y))Λ(W′βk(y˜))}
× H(W′βk(y˜))]W′,
Σ1,{1,d}(y, y˜) =E[I{T = 1,D = d}WH(W′β1(y))
×{min{Λ(W′β1(y)),Λ(W′β1,d(y˜))} − Λ(W′β1(y))Λ(W′β1,d(y˜))}
× H(W′β1,d(y˜))W′]
for each k ∈ {1, {1, d}d∈{0,1}, 0} and V1,0(y,w, y˜, w˜) = V{1,d},0(y,w, y˜, w˜) = 0.
Given the weak convergence of the distribution regressions, the conditional estimator
FˆYb |W,T,D(QˆYb |W,T (FˆY0 |W,T (y |w, 0)|w, 1)|w, 1, d)
is in the form of following map: for distribution functions F1,d, F1, F0,
m(F1,d, F1, F0) = F1,d ◦Q1 ◦ F0.
where Q1 is the quantile function from F1. In a parallel argument to Melly and Santangelo (2015)
based on quantile regressions, the above map is Hadamard differentiable from the Hadamard-
differentiability of the quantile function (Lemma 21.4 (ii), van der Vaart, 1998) and the chain rule
of the Hadamard-differentiable maps (Lemma 20.9, van der Vaart, 1998).
LemmaA.2. Let F1 and F1,d be uniformly continuous and differentiable distribution functions with
uniformly bounded densities f1 and f1,d . Let F0 be also a distribution function. Suppose F1 has a
support [a, b] as a bounded subset of real line, and F1 ◦Q1(p) = p for every p ∈ [0, 1].
Then the map m(F1,d, F1, F0) is Hadamard differentiable at (F1,d, F1, F0) tangentially to a set of
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functions h1,d, h1, h0 with the derivative map
h1,d ◦Q1 ◦ F0 − f1,d(Q1 ◦ F0)h1 ◦Q1 ◦ F0f1(Q1 ◦ F0) + f1,d(Q1 ◦ F0)
h0
f1(Q1 ◦ F0) .
Proof. See the appendix. 
Next, let
Gˆ( f ) = √n
(∫
f dFˆW,T,D −
∫
f dFW,T,D
)
where FˆW,T,D(w, t, d) = n−1 ∑ni=1 I{Wi ≤ w,T = t,D = d} for f ∈ F where F is a class of suitably
measurable functions29 including
{FY |W,K(y |·, k), y ∈ Yk, k ∈ K ≡ {{T = 1}, {T = 0}, {T = 1,D = d}d∈{0,1}}
and all the indicators of the rectangles in R¯dW .
From the derivative expression in the lemma above and the joint weak convergence of the
empirical processes, the counterfactual conditional distribution weakly converges.
Theorem A.3. Under assumptions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 , A.1 and A.2,
Gˆ( f ) G( f )
29Suitably measurability or P-measurability can be verified by showing the class is pointwise measurable.
A class F of measurable functions is pointwise measurable if there is a countable subset G ⊂ F such that for every
f ∈ F there is a sequence {gm} ∈ G such that
gm(x) → f (x)
for every x ∈ X.
For example, the class F ≡ {1{x ≤ t}, t ∈ R} is pointwise measurable. This is because we can take
G = {I{x ≤ t} : t ∈ Q}
which is countable, and for arbitrary t0 ∈ R which characterise the arbitrary function f (x) = {I{x ≤ t0}}, and the
sequence of functions
gm(x) = I{x ≤ tm}
such that tm ≥ t0, tm → t0 converges to f (x). Therefore, the relevant class used here is shown to be pointwise
measurable.
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in l∞(F ) for F specified earlier where G( f ) is a Brownian bridge, and
√
n
(
FˆY0 |W,T,D(y |w, 1, d) − FY0 |W,T,D(y |w, 1, d)
)
 GWCF1,d (y,w), in l∞(Y0 ×W)
where GWCFb,d (y,w) is a tight zero mean Gaussian process indexed by (y,w) such that
GWCF1,d (y,w)
=G1,d(QYb |W,T (FY0 |W,T (y |w, 0)|w, 1),w)
− f1,d(y,w)
f1(y,w)
(
G1(QYb |W,T (FY0 |W,T (y |w, 0)|w, 1),w) + G0(y,w)
)
.
where
f1,d(y,w)
f1(y,w) ≡
fYb |W,T,D(QYb |W,T (FY0 |W,T (y |w, 0)|w, 1)|w, 1, d)
fYb |W,T (QYb |W,T (FY0 |W,T (y |w, 0)|w, 1)|w, 1)
Proof. From lemma A.10 in Appendix, we can choose F satisfying the requirement defined earlier
so that F satisfies the DKP condition (Chernozhukov, Fernández-Val, and Melly, 2013, Appendix
A.). Then assumptions of Lemma E.4 in Chernozhukov, Fernández-Val, andMelly, 2013 is satisfied
to conclude the first statement.
For the second statement, note that
√
n
(
FˆY0 |T,W,D(y |1,w, d) − FY0 |T,W,D(y |1,w, d)
)
=
√
n
(
m(FˆYb |W=w,D=d, FˆYb |W=w, FˆY0 |W=w) − m(FYb |W=w,D=d, FYb |W=w, FY0 |W=w)
)
.
Therefore, the functional delta method and the Hadamard differentiability of the transformation
m(·, ·, ·) implies the above process weakly converges to the process shown in the statement. 
The unconditional counterfactual distribution is attained by applying the Lemma D.1 from
Chernozhukov, Fernández-Val, and Melly (2013) showing the Hadamard differentiability of the
counterfactual operator
φC(F,G) =
∫
F(y |w)dG(w)
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Theorem A.4. Under assumptions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, A.1 and A.2,
√
n
(
FˆY0 |T,D(y |1, d) − FY0 |T,D(y |1, d)
)
 GCF1,d (y), in l∞(Y0).
where GCF1,d (y) is a tight mean zero Gaussian process such that
GCF1,d (y) ≡α−11,d
∫
GWCF1,d (y,w)I{T = 1,D = d}dFW,T,D(w, 1, d)
+ α−11,dG(FY0 |W,T,D(y |w, 1, d)I{T = 1,D = d}).
Proof. Note that
√
nFˆY0 |T,D(y |1, d) =
√
n
FˆY0,T,D(y, 1, d)
n1,d/n
and
√
nFY0 |T,D(y |1, d) =
√
n
FY0,T,D(y, 1, d)
α1,d
.
Also we have,
√
n(FˆY0,T,D(y, 1, d) − FY0,T,D(y, 1, d))
=
√
n
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
FˆY0 |W,T,D(y |Wi, 1, d)I{Ti = 1,Di = d} −
∫
FY0 |W,T,D(y |W, 1, d)I{T = 1,D = d}dP
)
=
√
n
(∫
FˆY0 |W,T,D(y |W, 1, d)I{T = 1,D = d}dPn −
∫
FY0 |W,T,D(y |W, 1, d)I{T = 1,D = d}dP
)
.
From the Slutzky lemma (Theorem 18.10 (v) in van der Vaart, 1998), Functional delta method,
and the Hadamard differentiability of the operator φC(F,G) (Chernozhukov, Fernández-Val, and
Melly, 2013, Lemma D.1), we have
(√
n(FˆY0,T,D(y, 1, d) − FY0,T,D(y, 1, d)), n1,d/n
)
 
(
G˜(y,w, d), α1,d
)
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where
G˜(y,w, d) ≡
(∫
GWCF1,d (y,w)dFW,T,D(w, 1, d) + G(FY0 |W,T,D(y |·, 1, d)
)
I{T = 1,D = d})
Therefore, continuous mapping theorem (Theorem 18.11 in van der Vaart, 1998) implies the
statement. 
Corollary A.5. Under assumptions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, A.1 and A.2,
√
n
(
QˆY0 |T,D(y |1, d) −QY0 |T,D(y |1, d)
)
 −
GCF1,d (QY0 |T,D(y |1, d))
fY0 |T,D(QY0 |T,D(y |1, d)|1, d)
, in l∞(Y0)
for every d ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. Immediate from the Hadamard-differentiability of the quantile function (Lemma 21.4 (ii),
van der Vaart, 1998). 
Corollary A.6. Under assumptions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, A.1 and A.2,
√
n
(∫
ydFˆY0 |T,D(y |1, d) −
∫
yFY0 |T,D(y |1, d)
)
 
∫
ydGCF1,d (y)
Proof. Let µ(F) =
∫
ydF(y) be the mapping µ : F → R. Let ht → h as t → 0 and let Ft = F+ tht .
Then it is Hadamard differentiable at F tangentially to a set of functions h such that
1
t
(∫
ydFt −
∫
ydF
)
=
∫
ydht →t→∞
∫
ydh.
Since
√
n(FˆY0 |T,D(y |1, d) − FY0 |T,D(y |1, d)) GCF1,d (y),
the statement holds. 
Given the asymptotic normality, I propose an inference based on a bootstrap procedure. Suppose
the bootstrap draws are exchangeable.
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Assumption A.3 (Exchangeable bootstrap). Let (w1, . . . ,wn) is an exchangeable, non-negative
random vector independent of the data {Yi,Yb,i,Di,Wi,Ti}ni=1 such that for some  > 0,
E[w2+1 ] < ∞, n−1
n∑
i=1
(wi − w¯)2 →P 1, w¯ →P 1
where w¯ = n−1
∑n
i=1 wi, and P is an outer probability measure with respect to P.30
Let Fˆ∗Yb |W,T,D(y |w, 1, d), Fˆ∗Yb |W,T (y |w, 1), Fˆ∗Y0 |W,T (y |w, 0) be the bootstrapped version of the esti-
mators using
βˆ∗,k(y) = arg max
b∈RdW
n∑
i=1
wi I{Ki = k}
[
I{Yi ≤ y} logΛ(W′i b) + I{Yi > y} log(1 − Λ(W′i b))
]
and let
Fˆ∗W,T,D(w, 1, d) = (n∗)−1
n∑
i=1
wi I{Wi ≤ w,Ti = 1,Di = d},w ∈ W
where n∗ =
∑n
i wi.
Corollary A.7. Let
Gˆ∗( f ) = 1√
n
n∑
i=1
(wi − w¯) f
for f ∈ F , and let
Gˆ∗,k(y,w) = √n
(
Fˆ∗Y |W,K(y |w, k) − FˆY |W,K(y |w, k)
)
Then under assumptions 3.1, 3.2,3.3, 3.4, 3.5, A.1, A.2, and A.3
(
Gˆ∗,1,d(y,w), Gˆ∗,1(y,w), Gˆ∗,0(y,w), Gˆ∗( f )
)
 P
(
G1,d(y,w),G1(y,w),G0(y,w),G( f )
)
in l∞(Y1,db ×Wd × Y1b ×W ×Y0 ×W) × l∞(F ). Therefore,
√
n
(
Fˆ∗Y0 |T,D(y |1, d) − FˆY0 |T,D(y |1, d)
)
 P GCF1,d (y).
30For an arbitrary maps D : Ω 7→ D on a metric space D and a bounded function f : D 7→ R, P f (D) = inf{PU :
U : Ω 7→ R is measurable ,U ≥ f (D), PU exists.}
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Proof. Argument follows from Theorem 3.6.13 of van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) as employed
in Chernozhukov, Fernández-Val, and Melly (2013), Theorem 5.1 and 5.2. 
A.2 Asymptotic Normality and Bootstrap Validity for Clustered Samples
Alternative to the random sampling of individuals, consider the random sampling of clusters.
Assumption A.4 (Cluster DGP). Let c = 1, . . . , C¯ denote clusters, and an index (i, c) denote
individual i’s observation in a cluster c. Let
{N(c), {Y (i; c),Yb(i; c),D(i; c),W(i; c),T(c)}i≥1}c≥1
be exchangeable, namely, for any permutation pi of N,
{N(c), {Y (i; c),Yb(i; c),D(i; c),W(i; c),T(c)}i≥1}c≥1
∼ {Npi(c), {Y (i; pi(c)),Yb(i; pi(c)),D(i; pi(c)),W(i; pi(c)),T(pi(c))}i≥1}c≥1.
and clusters {N(c), {Y (i; c),Yb(i; c),D(i; c),W(i; c),T(c)} are independent across c. Suppose further
that E[N(1)] > 0, E[N(1)2] < ∞ and C¯ → ∞. As before, assume T is supported for {0, 1} and D
has a finite support {0, 1}.
Suppose also that the same support and density conditions as in assumption A.1. Furthermore,
αˆ1,d ≡ 1C¯
∑
1≤c≤C¯
1
N(c)
∑N(c)
i=1 I{T(c) = 1,D(i; c) = d} → α1,d whereα1,d ≡ E
[
1
N(1)
∑N(1)
i=1 I{T(c) = 1,D(i; c) = d}
]
>
0 for each d ∈ {0, 1} , and αˆ0 = 1C¯
∑
1≤c≤C¯ I{T(c) = 0} → α0 ≡ E[I{T(1) = 0}] > 0.
Assumption A.5 (Distribution Regression and Cluster Moment Condition). Suppose for each
k ∈ K,
FY k |W,K(y |w, k) = Λ(w′βk(y)),
for some link function Λ(·) for all y,w. Assume also that the minimal eigenvalue of Jk(y) ≡
E
[∑N1
i=1
λ(W ′i βk (y))2
Λ(W ′i βk (y))[1−Λ(W ′i βk (y))]
WiW′i
]
is bounded away from zero uniformly over y respectively for
k ∈ {0, 1, {1, d}d∈{0,1}}, where λ is the derivative ofΛ. Assume further that E
[
N1
∑N1
i=1 ‖Wi‖2
]
< ∞.
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Remark. The additional assumption of E[N1 ∑N1i=1 ‖Wi‖2] < ∞ is replacing the square integrability
of the envelope function const · ‖Wi‖ for a class of Z-maps as the first order conditions of the
semiparameteric distribution regressions. See the appendix for the exact argument of the envelope
function of the class of Z-maps.
From the linearity of the expectation operator, it is sufficient to have the cluster size finite
N1 < ∞ as well as the previous moment condition E[‖Wi‖2] < ∞ for every i ∈ N1.
Let
GˆC( f ) =
√
C¯ ©­« 1C¯
∑
1≤ j≤C¯
Nj∑
i=1
f (W j,i,Tj,i,D j,i) − E
[
N1∑
i=1
f (W1,i,T1,i,D1,i)
]ª®¬
and
GˆC,1,d(y1,dw) =
√
C¯
(
FˆCYb |W,T,D(y
1,d |w, 1, d) − FYb |W,T,D(y1,d |w, 1, d)
)
, ∀y1,d ∈ Yw,{1,d}b
GˆC,1(y1,w) =
√
C¯
(
FˆCYb |W,T (y
1 |w, 1) − FYb |W,T (y1 |w, 1)
)
, ∀y1 ∈ Yw,1b
GˆC,0(y0,w) =
√
C¯
(
FˆCY0 |W,T (y0 |w, 0) − FY0 |W,T (y0 |w, 0)
)
, ∀y0 ∈ Yw,0,
where
FˆCY |W,K(y |w, k) = Λ(w′ βˆC,k(y))
and
βˆC,k(y) = arg max
b∈RdW
C¯∑
j=1
Nj∑
i=1
{ [I{Yj,i ≤ y} log[Λ(w′b)]]
+
[
I{Yj,i > y} log[1 − Λ(w′b)]
]}
I{K j,i = k}
for each y ∈ Yk .
Corollary A.8. Under assumptions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, A.4 and A.5, we have
(
GˆC,1(y,w), GˆC,1,d(y,w), GˆC,0(y,w)
)
 
(
GC,1(y,w),GC,1,d(y,w),GC,0(y,w)
)
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in l∞(Yb ×W×Y1,db ×Wd ×Y0 ×W), where Gk(y,w) for every k ∈ {{1, d}d∈{0,1}, 1, 0} are tight
zero-mean Gaussian processes with each covariance function of the form
VCk,k(y,w, y˜, w˜) = α−1k w′J−1k (y)λk(w′βk(y))Σk(y, y˜)λk(w˜′βk(y˜))J−1k (y˜)w˜
V1,{1,d}(y,w, y˜, w˜) = α−11,dw′J−11 (y)λ1(w′β1(y))Σ1,{1,d}(y, y˜)λ1,d(w˜′β1,d(y˜))J−11,d(y˜)w˜
where
ΣCk (y, y˜) =E[
N1∑
i=1
I{K1,i = k}W1,iH(W′1,iβk(y))
×{min{Λ(W′1,iβk(y)),Λ(W′1,iβk(y˜))} − Λ(W′1,iβk(y))Λ(W′1,iβk(y˜))}
× H(W′1,iβk(y˜))]W′1,i,
ΣC1,{1,d}(y, y˜) =E[
N1∑
i=1
I{T1,i = 1,D1,i = d}W1,iH(W′1,iβ1(y))
×{min{Λ(W′1,iβ1(y)),Λ(W′1,iβ1,d(y˜))} − Λ(W′1,iβ1(y))Λ(W′1,iβ1,d(y˜))}
× H(W′1,iβ1,d(y˜))W′1,i]
for each k ∈ {{1, d}d∈{0,1}, 1, 0} and VC1,0(y,w, y˜, w˜) = VC{1,d},0(y,w, y˜, w˜) = 0, and we have
GˆC( f ) GC( f )
in l∞(F ) for suitably measurable F specified earlier where GC( f ) is a tight zero-mean Gaussian
process with the covariance kernel
VC( f1, f2) = Cov
(
N1∑
i=1
f1(W1,i,D1,i,T1,i),
N1∑
i=1
f2(W1,i,D1,i,T1,i)
)
Proof. It is sufficient to verify conditions for Theorem 3.1 in Davezies, D’Haultfoeuille, and Guy-
onvarch (2018). Assumption 1 is guaranteed by the exchangeable cluster assumption. Assumption
2 is assumed and can be verified to be pointwise measurable. For the assumption 3 in Davezies,
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D’Haultfoeuille, and Guyonvarch (2018), it is sufficient to show that the envelope function of the
class of Z-functions F satisfies
E[N1
N1∑
i=1
F(Y1,i,W1,i,D1,i,T1,i)2] < ∞
In fact, the envelope function is const · ‖Wi‖ and therefore it is sufficient to have
E[N1
N1∑
i=1
‖W1,i‖2] < ∞
which is guaranteed by the assumption. Finally, the finiteness of the uniform entropy integral is
also guaranteed by the lemma A.9 so that all the assumptions hold.
As the weak convergences of the Z-function processes are guaranteed, Functional Delta method
guarantees the statement to hold. 
A.3 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1. For the simplify of notations, omitW in the expressions.
P(F(Ub) ≤ τ |D = d,T = 1) = P(F(U + U˜b) ≤ τ |δ(U,V, 1) = d,T = 1)
=
∫
P(F(u + U˜b) ≤ τ |δ(u,V, 1) = d,T = 1,U = u)dFU |δ(u,V,1)=d,T=1(u)
=
∫
P(F(u + U˜b) ≤ τ |T = 1,U = u)dFU |δ(u,V,1)=d,T=1,U=u(u)
=
∫
P(F(u + U˜0) ≤ τ |T = 1,U = u)dFU |δ(u,V,1)=d,T=1,U=u(u)
=
∫
P(F(u + U˜0) ≤ τ |δ(u,V, 1) = d,T = 1,U = u)dFU |δ(u,V,1)=d,T=1,U=u(u)
=P(F(U0) ≤ τ |D = d,T = 1)

Proof of 6.1. For the proof, I omit the covariates as the same argument goes through under the
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common support assumption. Also, I omit T from most of the conditioning variables using the
randomization assumption. From the monotonicity, we have
F0Y |D=0,T=1(y) = P(Y0 ≤ y |D1 = 0) = P(Y00 ≤ y |D1 = 0,D0 = 0)
=P(U00 ≤ F00Y |D=0,T=0(y)|D1 = 0,D0 = 0)
for any value of y in the support of Y0 |D1 = 0 because the support of Y0 |D1 = 0 is the subset of the
support of Y0 |D0 = 0 from the monotonicity. From the rank similarity, we have
P(U00 ≤ F00Y |D=0,T=0(y)|D1 = 0,D0 = 0)
=P(Ub0 ≤ F00Y |D=0,T=0(y)|D1 = 0,D0 = 0).
The continuity of the baseline varible allows us to invert back in the level
P(Ub0 ≤ F00Y |D=0,T=0(y)|D1 = 0,D0 = 0)
=P(Yb ≤ QbY |D=0,T=0(F00Y |D=0,T=0(y))|D1 = 0,D0 = 0)
=P(Yb ≤ QbY |D=0,T=0(F00Y |D=0,T=0(y))|D1 = 0),
and the last equality follows from the monotonicity again. 
Proof of Lemma A.1. Step 1: Weak convergences of Z-functions
For the proof of the lemma A.1, we would like to introduce approximate Z-map notations.
For every y ∈ Y, let Ψ(y, β) be dW-vector of population moment equations such that the
true parameter β∗ ∈ RdW solves the moment condition Ψ(y, β) = 0. Let Ψˆ(y, β) be an empirical
analogue. Let an estimator βˆ(y) satisfies
‖Ψˆ(y, βˆ(y))‖2 ≤ inf
β∈RdW
‖Ψˆ(y, β)‖2 + rˆ(y)2
where rˆ(y) is a numerical tolerance parameter with ‖rˆ ‖Y = op(n−1/2).
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Let φ(Ψ(y, ·), r(y)) : l∞(R)dW × R 7→ RdW be an approximate Z-map which assigns one of its
r(y)-approximate zeros to each element Ψ(y, ·) so that
βˆ(·) = φ(Ψˆ(·, ·), rˆ(·)), β∗(·) = φ(Ψ(·, ·), 0).
For each q = 1, . . . , dW , let
ψ
0,q
y,β0
(Y,W,T) = I{T = 0} [Λ(W′β0) − I{Y ≤ y}] H(W′β0)Wq,
ψ
1,q
y,β1
(Y,W,T) = I{T = 1} [Λ(W′β1) − I{Yb ≤ y}] H(W′β1)Wq,
ψ
{1,d},q
y,β1,d
(Y,W,T,D) = I{T = 1,D = d} [Λ(W′β1,d) − I{Yb ≤ y}] H(W′β1,d)Wq,
and for each d ∈ D1. Also let ψ0y,β0 , ψ1y,β1 and ψ
1,d
y,β1,d
be dW-vector valued functions with each q-th
coordinate being ψ0,q
y,β0
, ψ1,q
y,β1
and ψ{1,d},q
y,β1,d
.
In the lemma A.9 below, it is shown that the union of classes of functions
∪d∈D1,q∈{1,...,dW}{ψ0,qy,β0(Y,W,T) : (y, β0) ∈ Y × RdW )}
∪ {ψ1,q
y,β1
(Y,W,T) : (y, β1) ∈ Y × RdW )}
∪ {ψ{1,d},q
y,β1,d
(Y,W,T) : (y, β1,d) ∈ Y × RdW )},
is P-Donsker with a square-integrable envelope function. Let Ψˆt = Pnψty,βt, Ψˆ
1,d = Pnψ
1,d
y,β1,d
and
Ψt = Pψt
y,βt
,Ψ1,d = Pψ1,d
y,β1,d
for each t ∈ {0, 1}, then the Donskerness implies
(√
n(Ψˆ1 − Ψ1),√n(Ψˆ0 − Ψ0),√n(Ψˆ1,d − Ψ1,d)
)
 (G(ψ1
y1,β1
),G(ψ0
y0,β0
),G(ψ1,d
y1,d,β1,d
))
in l∞(Y1b ×RdW )dW×l∞(Y0×RdW )dW×l∞(Y1,db ×RdW )dW whereG(ψky,βk ) for each k ∈ {1, 0, {1, d}}
are P-Brownian bridges.
Step 2: Applying Functional Delta method through Stacking rule
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From the first order conditions, βˆk(y) = φk(Ψˆk(y, ·), rˆ k(y)), rˆ k(y) = max1≤i≤n ‖Wi‖dW/n for
each y ∈ Yk and n1/2‖rˆ ‖Yk →P 0, and βk(y) = φk(Ψk(y, ·), 0) for each y ∈ Yk for every
k ∈ {1, 0, {1, d}}.
Following the argument of Chernozhukov et al. (2013), the three kinds of approximate Z-maps
φ1, φ0, φ1,d are Hadamard differentiable for each case, and from the Stacking Rule as in Lemma B.2
of Chernozhukov et al. (2013), we have
(√
n(βˆ1(y1) − β1(y1)),√n(βˆ0(y0) − β0(y0)),√n(βˆ1,d(y1,d) − β1,d(y1,d))
)
 
(
−J−11 G(ψ1y1,β1(y1)),−J−10 G(ψ0y0,β0(y0)),−J−11,dG(ψ1,dy1,d,β1,d(y1,d))
)
in l∞(Y1b )dW × l∞(Y0)dW × l∞(Y1,db )dW by the functional delta method.
Step 3: Applying another Hadamard differentiable map to conclude the statement
Finally, consider the mapping νk : Dνk ⊂ l∞(Yk)dW 7→ l∞(Yk ×W) such that
b 7→ νk(b), νk(b)(w, y) = Λ(w′b(y))
for every k ∈ {1, 0, {1, d}}. From the Hadamard differentiability of νk at bk(·) = βk(y) tangentially
to C(Yk)dW with the derivative map α 7→ ν′
βk (·)(α)(w, y) = λ(w′βk(y))w′α(y). From the stacking
rule, applying the mapping for each process, the statement of the lemma holds. 
Lemma A.9. Under the assumptions of the lemma A.1, the class of functions
∪d∈D1,q∈{1,...,dW}{ψ0,qy,β0(Y,W,T) : (y, β0) ∈ Y0 × RdW )}
∪ {ψ1,q
y,β1
(Y,W,T) : (y, β1) ∈ Y1b × RdW )}
∪ {ψ{1,d},q
y,β1,d
(Y,W,T) : (y, β1,d) ∈ Y1,db × RdW )},
is P-Donsker with a square-integrable envelope.
Proof. From Theorem 19.14 in van der Vaart (1998), a suitable measurable class of measurable
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functions G is P-Donsker if the uniform entropy integral with respect to an envelope function G
J(1,G, L2) =
∫ 1
0
√
log sup
Q
N[]( ‖G‖Q,2,G, L2(G))d
is finite and the envelope function G satisfies P1G2 < ∞.
Consider classes of functions
F1 = {W′β : β ∈ RdW }, F2,k = {I{Y ≤ y}, y ∈ Yk}, {Wq : q = 1, . . . , dw}
which are VC classes of functions. Note that the target class of functions is the union of
{I{T = t}(Λ(F1) − F2,t)H(F1)Wq : q = 1, . . . , dw}
for each t ∈ {0, 1} and
{I{T = 1,D = d}(Λ(F1) − F2,{1,d})H(F1)Wq : q = 1, . . . , dw}
for each d ∈ D1. These are Lipschitz transformation of VC-class of functions and finite set of
functions I{T = t} and I{T = 1,D = d} where the Lipschitz coefficients bounded by const · ‖W ‖.
Therefore, from Example 19.19 of van der Vaart (1998), the constructed class of functions has
the finite uniform entropy integral relative to the envelope function const · ‖W ‖ which is square-
integrable from the assumption. Suitable measurability is granted as it is a pointwise measurable
class of functions. Thus, the class of functions is Donsker. 
LemmaA.10. Under assumptions 3.3, 3.5 and A.1, it is possible to construct a class of measurable
functions F including
{FY |W,K(y |·, k), y ∈ Yk, k ∈ K ≡ {{T = 1}, {T = 0}, {T = 1,D = d}d∈D1}
and all the indicators of the rectangles in R¯dW such that F is DKP class (Chernozhukov et al.,
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2013, Appendix A.).
Proof. As in Step 2 in the proofs of Theorem 5.1 and 5.2 in Chernozhukov et al. (2013), F1 =
{FY |W,T (y |·, 1), y ∈ Y1b }, F0 = {FY |W,T (y |·, 0), y ∈ Y0} and F1,d = {FY |W,T,D(y |·, 1, d), y ∈ Y1,db } are
uniformly bounded “parametric” family (Example 19.7 in van der Vaart (1998)) indexed by y ∈ Yk
for each k ∈ {1, 0, {1, d}} respectively. From the assumption that the density function fY |W,K(y |·, k)
is uniformly bounded,
|FY |W,K(y |·, k)I{K = k} − FY |W,K(y′|·, k)I{K = k}| ≤ L |y − y′|
for some constant L for every k ∈ {1, 0, {1, d}}. The compactness of Yk implies the uniform
-covering numbers to be bounded by const/ independent of FW so that the Pollard’s entropy
condition is met. As noted in footnote in the section 4, the class of F is suitably measurable as
well. As indicator functions of all rectangles in R¯dW form a VC class, we can construct F that
contains union of all the families F0, F1 and F1,d and the indicators of all the rectangles in R¯dW that
satisfies DKP condition.

For the proof of the Hadamard derivative expression, I show the following lemma.
Lemma A.11. Suppose F1 is a uniformly continuous and differentiable distribution function with
uniformly bounded density function f1 with its support [a, b] where 0 < a < b < 1. Let ψF1(p) =
Q1(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1].
Let F0 be a distribution function over a support Y0, then ψF1 is Hadamard differentiable at F0
tangentially to a set of function h0 with the derivative map
h0
f1 ◦Q1 ◦ F0 .
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Proof. From the assumption, we have
F1 ◦Q1 ◦ (F0 + th0t) − F1 ◦Q1 ◦ F0 = (F0 + th0t) − F0 = th0t .
Let h0t → h0 uniformly inY0 as t → 0, and let gt ≡ ψF1 ◦ (F0 + h0t) and g ≡ ψF1 ◦F0. Then gt → g
uniformly in Y0 as t → 0 by the assumption.
Thus, we have
F1(gt) − F1(g)
gt − g
gt − g
t
= h0t
so that we have
gt − g
t
=
h0t
F1(gt )−F1(g)
gt−g
whereas the RHS has a limit
h0t
F1(gt )−F1(g)
gt−g
→t→0 h0
f1 ◦Q1 ◦ F0
by the uniform differentiability of F1.

Proof of Lemma A.2. First, let φ(F1, F0) ≡ Q1 ◦ F0 so that m(F1,d, F1, F0) = F1,d ◦ φ(F1, F0). From
the lemma A.11 and the lemma 21.4 (ii) from van der Vaart (1998), φ is Hadamard differentiable
at (F1, F0) tangentially to the set of functions (h1, h0) with the derivative map
−h1 ◦Q1 ◦ F0
f1 ◦Q1 ◦ F0 +
h0
f1 ◦Q1 ◦ F0 .
Therefore, from the Chain rule of the Hadamard differentiability (lemma 20.9, van der Vaart, 1998),
the map m is Hadamard differentiable with the derivative map shown in the lemma. 
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A.4 Quantile Difference Plots
Figure 2: Quantile difference for D = 0 with Uniform 95% CI
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Figure 3: Quantile difference for D = 1 with Uniform 95% CI
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A.5 Robustness to other link functions
Table 5: ATT estimates with other link functions
Link: Logit Probit comp LogLog Cauchy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 1.0252** 1.0280** 1.0259** 1.0548**
(0.4180) (0.4207) (0.4096) (0.4485)
Obs 2453 2453 2453 2453
Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis are generated from 300 bootstrap draws clus-
tered in randomization cluster levels for (1)-(4). *,**,*** indicates statistical significance
of 10%,5% and 1% sizes respectively.
Table 6: Direct effect estimates with other link functions
Link: Logit Probit comp LogLog Cauchy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.2837 0.2805 0.2867 0.3192
(0.2628) (0.2612) (0.2434) (0.2504)
Obs 2453 2453 2453 2453
Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis are generated from 300 bootstrap draws clus-
tered in randomization cluster levels for (1)-(4). *,**,*** indicates statistical significance
of 10%,5% and 1% sizes respectively.
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